Disproportionate ownership structure and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China

Xiaoming Wang, Jerry Cao, Qigui Liu, Jinghua Tang, Gary Gang Tian*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest of long-run shareholders.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)27-42
Number of pages16
JournalChina Economic Review
Volume32
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2015
Externally publishedYes

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