Abstract
Richard Heersmink argues that self-narratives are distributed across embodied organisms and their environment, given that their building blocks, autobiographical memories, are distributed. This argument faces two problems. First, it commits a fallacy of composition. Second, it relies on Marya Schechtman's narrative self-constitution view, which is incompatible with the distributed cognition framework. To solve these problems, this article develops an alternative account of self-narratives. On this account, we actively connect distributed autobiographical memories through distributed conversational and textual self-narrative practices. This account enhances our understanding of the memory–narrative nexus and has implications for philosophical conceptions of self.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1258-1275 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Mind & Language |
| Volume | 38 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| Early online date | 25 Jan 2023 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Copyright the Author(s) 2023. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.Keywords
- autobiographical memory
- distributed cognition
- narrative practices
- self
- self-narrative