TY - JOUR
T1 - Divided brains and unified phenomenology
T2 - A review essay on michael tye's consciousness and persons
AU - Bayne, Tim
PY - 2005/8
Y1 - 2005/8
N2 - In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge) MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.
AB - In Consciousness and persons, Michael Tye (Tye, M. (2003). Consciousness and persons. Cambridge) MA: MIT Press.) develops and defends a novel approach to the unity of consciousness. Rather than thinking of the unity of consciousness as involving phenomenal relations between distinct experiences, as standard accounts do, Tye argues that we should regard the unity of consciousness as involving relations between the contents of consciousness. Having developed an account of what it is for consciousness to be unified, Tye goes on to apply his account of the unity of consciousness to the split-brain syndrome. I provide a critical evaluation of Tye's account of the unity of consciousness and the split-brain syndrome.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=24944514025&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09515080500229993
DO - 10.1080/09515080500229993
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:24944514025
SN - 0951-5089
VL - 18
SP - 495
EP - 512
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
IS - 4
ER -