Does broker anonymity hide informed traders?

Andrew Lepone, Reuben Segara, Brad Wong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)


This study investigates whether broker anonymity impairs the ability of the market to detect informed trading in the lead up to takeover announcements. Our research represents the first study in this area to analyse the effects of broker anonymity in the context of significant information asymmetry. Results indicate that informed traders are less detected, and therefore better off when broker identifiers are concealed. This finding has important policy implications for exchange officials deciding whether or not to reveal broker identifiers surrounding trades, especially considering that almost all prior research suggests that broker anonymity is correlated with improved liquidity.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTransparency and Governance in a Global World
EditorsJ. Jay Choi, Heibatollah Sami
Place of PublicationBingley, UK
PublisherEmerald Insight
Number of pages31
ISBN (Print)9781780527642
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Publication series

NameInternational Finance Review
ISSN (Print)15693767

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  • Cite this

    Lepone, A., Segara, R., & Wong, B. (2012). Does broker anonymity hide informed traders? In J. J. Choi, & H. Sami (Eds.), Transparency and Governance in a Global World (Vol. 13, pp. 287-317). (International Finance Review; Vol. 13). Bingley, UK: Emerald Insight.