Abstract
This paper continues a debate on the normative limits of conceptual engineering. In particular, it responds to [Isaac, Manuel Gustavo. 2021. “Post-truth conceptual engineering.” Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2021.1887758] claim, in response to [Simion, Mona. 2018a. “The ‘Should’ in Conceptual Engineering.” Inquiry 61(8): 914–928 and Podosky, Paul-Mikhail Catapang. 2018. “Ideology and Normativity: Constraints on Conceptual Engineering.” Inquiry. doi:10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562374], but in particular Podosky, that cognitive efficacy, rather than truth and knowledge, should be the normative standard by which we assess the legitimacy of a conceptual engineering project–at least for ideological concepts. I argue that Isaac has not done enough to show us that truth and knowledge are insignificant for the conceptual engineering of ideological concepts.
Original language | English |
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Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Inquiry |
Early online date | 19 May 2022 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | E-pub ahead of print - 19 May 2022 |
Keywords
- conceptual engineering
- ideology
- representationalism
- social constructionism