Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

36 Citations (Scopus)


I argue that the intellectualist account of knowledge-how, according to which agents have the knowledge-how to in virtue of standing in an appropriate relation to a proposition, is only half right. On the composition view defended here, knowledge-how at least typically requires both propositional knowledge and motor representations. Motor representations are not mere dispositions to behavior (so the older dispositionalist view isn't even half right) because they have representational content, and they play a central role in realizing the intelligence in knowledge-how. But since motor representations are not propositional, propositional knowledge is not sufficient for knowledge-how.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)511-530
Number of pages20
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Feb 2017


  • knowledge-how
  • epistemology
  • motor representations
  • Stanley


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