Abstract
Public health emergencies—whether pandemics, natural, or human-caused disasters—give rise to distinct knowledge needs and sometimes justify new or invasive forms of data gathering and surveillance to meet these needs. In this chapter we focus on the knowledge-related aspects of surveillance for public health emergencies. We argue that distinctive features of public health emergencies can give rise to epistemic injustices, including testimonial injustices and dysfunctions associated with trust. If unaddressed, these threaten not only the fairness and moral acceptability of the public health response but also the epistemic goals of public health surveillance. That is, inattention to epistemic injustices in public health emergencies can undermine the ability of authorities to collect essential data needed to manage the emergency and ensure public safety.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The ethics of surveillance in times of emergency |
| Editors | Kevin Macnish, Adam Henschke |
| Place of Publication | Oxford, UK |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Chapter | 5 |
| Pages | 76-92 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191955372 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780192864918 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2023 |
Bibliographical note
Copyright the Publisher 2024. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.Keywords
- epistemic injustice
- applied epistemology
- trust
- public safety