TY - CHAP
T1 - Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability, and Wittgensteinian epistemology
AU - Pritchard, Duncan
PY - 2011/4/20
Y1 - 2011/4/20
N2 - A certain conception of a specifically epistemic form of relativism is discussed, one that is brought to the fore by a particular problem that arises in the epistemology of disagreement. Such relativism turns on a form of epistemic incommensurability whereby a dispute between truth - seekers with opposing beliefs cannot satisfactorily be resolved by (epistemically) rational means. Wittgenstein's writings on epistemology - particularly in his final work, On Certainty - are of relevance to this problem. On the one hand, one can read him as putting forward an epistemological proposal, one that has the notion of a "hinge proposition" at its heart, which actually licenses epistemic incommensurability, and hence epistemic relativism. On the other hand, there are also suggestions in Wittgenstein's writings on this topic that may offer a resolution to this problem.
AB - A certain conception of a specifically epistemic form of relativism is discussed, one that is brought to the fore by a particular problem that arises in the epistemology of disagreement. Such relativism turns on a form of epistemic incommensurability whereby a dispute between truth - seekers with opposing beliefs cannot satisfactorily be resolved by (epistemically) rational means. Wittgenstein's writings on epistemology - particularly in his final work, On Certainty - are of relevance to this problem. On the one hand, one can read him as putting forward an epistemological proposal, one that has the notion of a "hinge proposition" at its heart, which actually licenses epistemic incommensurability, and hence epistemic relativism. On the other hand, there are also suggestions in Wittgenstein's writings on this topic that may offer a resolution to this problem.
KW - Adam's adversary, "Eve" - acquiring her belief about the age of the earth from studying relevant areas of science at school
KW - Distinctive problem, raised by epistemology of disagreement - relevant to discussion of epistemic relativism
KW - Epistemic relativism, epistemic incommensurability and Wittgensteinian epistemology
KW - Epistemology of disagreement - disputes of the sort that concern us
KW - From epistemology of disagreement - to epistemic relativism
KW - Specifically epistemic form of relativism
KW - Wittgenstein's argument for hinge propositions - entailing epistemic incommensurability thesis
KW - Wittgenstein's writings on epistemology
KW - Wittgensteinian epistemology and epistemic relativism
KW - Wittgensteinian epistemology reconsidered
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84876876150&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/9781444392494.ch14
DO - 10.1002/9781444392494.ch14
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:84876876150
SN - 9781405190213
T3 - Blackwell companions to philosophy
SP - 266
EP - 285
BT - A companion to relativism
A2 - Hales, Steven D.
PB - Wiley-Blackwell, Wiley
CY - Chichester, West Sussex, UK
ER -