Epistemic situationism: an extended prolepsis

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Abstract

This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, and 4) that weakening the reliability requirement through epistemic dependence or abilism means that common inferential strategies really are virtues. The paper concludes with reflections on the replication crisis in psychological science.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEpistemic situationism
EditorsAbrol Fairweather, Mark Alfano
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages44-61
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9780199688234
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • virtue epistemology
  • epistemic situationism
  • knowledge
  • C.A.P.S.
  • Big Six
  • epistemic dependence

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