Epistemic Value

Adrian Haddock*, Alan Millar, Duncan Pritchard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Book/ReportBookpeer-review

54 Citations (Scopus)


This book contains a collection of chapters on value in epistemology. Two themes loom large. One is about the value of knowledge. There are problems deriving from Plato's Meno concerning whether knowledge is more valuable than states implicating true belief but falling short of knowledge. The other theme is about epistemic value in a broad sense. Here the central issue is how to make sense of epistemic appraisal conceived broadly to include evaluation of beliefs with respect to whether they are, for instance, justified, or formed through methods or processes that reliably yield true beliefs. A common approach is to think of truth as the end for the sake of which we value a belief being justifiably or reliably formed. The themes are related. We might hope to explain why knowledge is valuable in terms of the value we place on truth. Yet an interest in epistemic appraisal can lead in other directions. For instance, it can prompt enquiry into why we should value truth, how the goal of truth should be conceived, and why, if at all, we should think of truth as the goal of enquiry. All of these issues are represented in this book.

Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationOxford,UK
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages368
ISBN (Electronic)9780191710827
ISBN (Print)9780199231188
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2009
Externally publishedYes


  • Epistemic appraisal
  • Epistemic value
  • Goal of enquiry
  • Meno problem
  • True belief
  • Value of knowledge
  • Value of truth


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