Epistemological disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Book/ReportBook

147 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This book offers a defence of epistemological disjunctivism. This is an account of perceptual knowledge which contends that such knowledge is paradigmatically constituted by a true belief which enjoys rational support which is both factive and reflectively accessible to the agent. In particular, in a case of paradigmatic perceptual knowledge that p, the subject's rational support for believing that p is that she sees that p, where this rational support is both reflectively accessible and factive (i.e., it entails p). This account of perceptual knowledge poses a radical challenge to contemporary epistemology, since by the lights of standard views in epistemology this proposal is simply incoherent. The aim of the book is to show that this proposal is theoretically viable (i.e., that it does not succumb to the problems that it appears to face), and to demonstrate that this is an account of perceptual knowledge which we would want to endorse if it were available on account of its tremendous theoretical potential. In particular, it is argued that epistemological disjunctivism offers a way through the impasse between epistemic externalism and internalism, and also provides the foundation for a distinctive response to the problem of radical scepticism.

Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationOxford, United Kingdom
PublisherOxford University Press
Number of pages192
ISBN (Electronic)9780191743290
ISBN (Print)9780199557912
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • assertion
  • discrimination
  • disjunctivism
  • epistemic externalism
  • internalism
  • epistemology
  • evidence
  • knowledge
  • Mooreanism
  • perception

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