Evidentialism, internalism, disjunctivism

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Duncan Pritchard argues that Conee and Feldman have made a mistake by tying their evidentialist views to a classical internalism which accepts the theses of MENT, ACCESS, and DISC. The polar opposite of this classical internalist position is classical externalism, which denies MENT, ACCESS, and DISC. But, Pritchard observes, there are positions intermediate between classical internalism and classical externalism. In particular, there is the epistemic disjunctivist's position which accepts MENT and ACCESS but denies DISC. Pritchard argues that this disjunctivist position is favorable to the classical internalist position because it provides a better response to skepticism, while overcoming all of the most threatening objections urged against it.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEvidentialism and its Discontents
EditorsTrent Dougherty
Place of PublicationOxford, United Kingdom
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages235-253
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9780191728686
ISBN (Print)9780199563500
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Disjunctivism
  • Evidence
  • Internalism

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