Evolution is about populations, but its causes are about individuals

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

There is a tension between, on the one hand, the view that natural selection refers to individual-level causes, and on the other hand, the view that it refers to a population-level cause. In this article, I make the case for the individual-level cause view. I respond to recent claims made by McLoone that the individual-level cause view is inconsistent. I show that if one were to follow his arguments, any causal claim in any context would have to be regarded as vindicating a form of population-level cause view. I show why this is implausible and how a consistent individual-level cause position can be held within the interventionist account of causation. Finally, I argue that there is one sense in which natural selection might be said to refer to population-level causes of evolutionary change. The upshot is that, as noted by others, natural selection can be regarded as referring to a population-level cause in the context of frequency-dependent selection and other situations of fitness-altering interactions between the individuals of a population. But whether this statement is true will depend on the empirical case investigated, not some a priori conceptual distinction. Thus, even though situations of frequency dependence might be ubiquitous, it is orthogonal to the conceptual question of whether frequency-independent natural selectionMcLoone's targetrefers to individual- or population-level causes.
LanguageEnglish
Pages254-266
Number of pages13
JournalBiological Theory
Volume14
Issue number4
Early online date12 Oct 2019
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Dec 2019

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Causes
Natural Selection
Interaction
Evolutionary
Causation
Fitness
Causal

Keywords

  • Causation
  • Drift
  • Individual-level causes
  • Modularity
  • Natural selection
  • Population-level causes

Cite this

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title = "Evolution is about populations, but its causes are about individuals",
abstract = "There is a tension between, on the one hand, the view that natural selection refers to individual-level causes, and on the other hand, the view that it refers to a population-level cause. In this article, I make the case for the individual-level cause view. I respond to recent claims made by McLoone that the individual-level cause view is inconsistent. I show that if one were to follow his arguments, any causal claim in any context would have to be regarded as vindicating a form of population-level cause view. I show why this is implausible and how a consistent individual-level cause position can be held within the interventionist account of causation. Finally, I argue that there is one sense in which natural selection might be said to refer to population-level causes of evolutionary change. The upshot is that, as noted by others, natural selection can be regarded as referring to a population-level cause in the context of frequency-dependent selection and other situations of fitness-altering interactions between the individuals of a population. But whether this statement is true will depend on the empirical case investigated, not some a priori conceptual distinction. Thus, even though situations of frequency dependence might be ubiquitous, it is orthogonal to the conceptual question of whether frequency-independent natural selectionMcLoone's targetrefers to individual- or population-level causes.",
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Evolution is about populations, but its causes are about individuals. / Bourrat, Pierrick.

In: Biological Theory, Vol. 14, No. 4, 12.2019, p. 254-266.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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