Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold

Tim Bayne, Elisabeth Pacherie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We see two clusters of questions arising out of the papers in this issue. The first cluster concerns the role of experience in the explanation of delusions: Do abnormal experiences play a central role in accounting for delusions, or are they at best only marginal? And if experience plays a central role in accounting for delusions, exactly what role does it play? The second cluster of questions concerns the interpretability of delusions: Are delusional utterances meaningful, or are they mere noises? And if they are meaningful, what makes it the case that they are meaningful?
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-86
Number of pages6
JournalPhilosophy, psychiatry, & psychology
Volume11
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2004

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