Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold

Tim Bayne, Elisabeth Pacherie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We see two clusters of questions arising out of the papers in this issue. The first cluster concerns the role of experience in the explanation of delusions: Do abnormal experiences play a central role in accounting for delusions, or are they at best only marginal? And if experience plays a central role in accounting for delusions, exactly what role does it play? The second cluster of questions concerns the interpretability of delusions: Are delusional utterances meaningful, or are they mere noises? And if they are meaningful, what makes it the case that they are meaningful?
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)81-86
Number of pages6
JournalPhilosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2004


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