Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold

Tim Bayne; Elisabeth Pacherie

Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold

Tim Bayne, Elisabeth Pacherie

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We see two clusters of questions arising out of the papers in this issue. The first cluster concerns the role of experience in the explanation of delusions: Do abnormal experiences play a central role in accounting for delusions, or are they at best only marginal? And if experience plays a central role in accounting for delusions, exactly what role does it play? The second cluster of questions concerns the interpretability of delusions: Are delusional utterances meaningful, or are they mere noises? And if they are meaningful, what makes it the case that they are meaningful?

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	81-86
Number of pages	6
Journal	Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology
Volume	11
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - 2004

Cite this

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title = "Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold",

abstract = "We see two clusters of questions arising out of the papers in this issue. The first cluster concerns the role of experience in the explanation of delusions: Do abnormal experiences play a central role in accounting for delusions, or are they at best only marginal? And if experience plays a central role in accounting for delusions, exactly what role does it play? The second cluster of questions concerns the interpretability of delusions: Are delusional utterances meaningful, or are they mere noises? And if they are meaningful, what makes it the case that they are meaningful?",

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Experience, belief, and the interpretive fold

Abstract

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