Abstract
What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e., extended knowledge)? This question is explored in the context of anti-luck virtue epistemology. It is argued that what is key to extended cognitive processes is how they are cognitively integrated within the cognitive character of the agent. In this context, anti-luck virtue epistemology is shown to be comfortably able to accommodate cases of extended knowledge; it is also explained that such a theory of knowledge can allow for a relatively broad range of instances of extended knowledge, including cases that do not essentially involve the manifestation of intellectual virtue, and cases that involve positive epistemic dependence. Finally, it is argued that while the threshold for extended knowledge may be relatively low, this should not preclude generally preferring an extended knowledge that involves an epistemic standing that extends far above that threshold.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Extended epistemology |
Editors | J. Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, S. Orestis Palermos, Duncan Pritchard |
Place of Publication | Oxford, UK |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Pages | 90-104 |
Number of pages | 15 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780198769811 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Anti-luck virtue epistemology
- Epistemic dependence
- Epistemology
- Extended cognition
- Extended knowledge