Abstract
What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e. extended knowledge)? It is argued that virtue epistemology, at least of an epistemic externalist kind (virtue reliabilism, as it is known), offers the resources to satisfactorily answer this question, provided that one rids the view of its implicit (and sometimes explicit) commitment to epistemic individualism. Nonetheless, it is also claimed that while virtue reliabilism can accommodate extended cognition, there are limits to the extent to which virtuous epistemic standings can be extended. In particular, it is argued that it is in the nature of intellectual virtue to be directed at non-extended epistemic standings. This point has important implications for an extended virtue epistemology, as is illustrated by considering how this point plays out in the context of the contemporary debate regarding the epistemology of education.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 632-647 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Inquiry (United Kingdom) |
Volume | 61 |
Issue number | 5-6 |
Early online date | 31 Jul 2017 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 30 Jul 2018 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- epistemology
- epistemology of education
- extended cognition
- intellectual virtue
- virtue epistemology