Extended virtue epistemology

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Citations (Scopus)
163 Downloads (Pure)


What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e. extended knowledge)? It is argued that virtue epistemology, at least of an epistemic externalist kind (virtue reliabilism, as it is known), offers the resources to satisfactorily answer this question, provided that one rids the view of its implicit (and sometimes explicit) commitment to epistemic individualism. Nonetheless, it is also claimed that while virtue reliabilism can accommodate extended cognition, there are limits to the extent to which virtuous epistemic standings can be extended. In particular, it is argued that it is in the nature of intellectual virtue to be directed at non-extended epistemic standings. This point has important implications for an extended virtue epistemology, as is illustrated by considering how this point plays out in the context of the contemporary debate regarding the epistemology of education.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)632-647
Number of pages16
JournalInquiry (United Kingdom)
Issue number5-6
Early online date31 Jul 2017
Publication statusPublished - 30 Jul 2018
Externally publishedYes


  • epistemology
  • epistemology of education
  • extended cognition
  • intellectual virtue
  • virtue epistemology


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