Fair allocations using multicriteria power indices

RC van den Honert*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

    Abstract

    In an allocation problem to determine a fair distribution of some divisible benefit or cost amongst members of a group, there are often a number of input criteria which may be used to make the allocation. We propose the weighted multicriteria power index, which combines traditional voting power in committees with the concept of criteria weighting, to yield a fair allocation. The multicriteria power index can be refined to allow for a moderation or amplification of the voting power of the members of the group, which in the limit would lead to parity or priority (respectively) of the members' power. Two well-documented power indices (the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf-Coleman power indices) are extended to operate under multiple criteria, and are used in an illustrative example.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationResearch and practice in multiple criteria decision making
    EditorsYY Haimes, RE Steuer
    PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
    Pages530-541
    Number of pages12
    ISBN (Print)3540672664
    Publication statusPublished - 2000
    Event14th International Conference on Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) - CHARLOTTESVILLE
    Duration: 8 Jun 199812 Jun 1998

    Publication series

    NameLecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
    PublisherSpringer-Verlag Berlin
    Volume487
    ISSN (Print)0075-8442

    Conference

    Conference14th International Conference on Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)
    CityCHARLOTTESVILLE
    Period8/06/9812/06/98

    Keywords

    • salience
    • multicriteria power index
    • allocation of a divisible commodity
    • VOTING POWER

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