First-person interventions and the meta-problem of consciousness

Colin Klein*, Andrew B. Barron

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Chalmers’ (2018) meta-problem of consciousness emphasizes unexpected common ground between otherwise incompatible positions. We argue that the materialist should welcome discussion of the meta-problem. We suggest that the core of the metaproblem is the seeming arbitrariness of subjective experience. This has an unexpected resolution when one moves to an interventionist account of scientific explanation: the same interventions that resolve the hard problem should also resolve the meta-problem.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)82-90
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Consciousness Studies
Volume27
Issue number5-6
Publication statusPublished - 2020

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