Forgery and partial key-recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using hash collisions

Scott Contini, Yiqun Lisa Yin

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

73 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the security of HMAC and NMAC, both of which are hash-based message authentication codes. We present distinguishing, forgery, and partial key recovery attacks on HMAC and NMAC using collisions of MD4, MD5, SHA-0, and reduced SHA-1. Our results demonstrate that the strength of a cryptographic scheme can be greatly weakened by the insecurity of the underlying hash function.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAdvances in cryptology - ASIACRYPT 2006
Subtitle of host publication12th international conference on the theory and application of cryptology and information security Shanghai, China, December 3-7, 2006 : proceedings
EditorsXuejia Lai, Kefei Chen
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages37-53
Number of pages17
ISBN (Print)3540494758
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2006
EventInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (12th : 2006) - Shanghai
Duration: 3 Dec 20067 Dec 2006

Publication series

NameLecture notes in computer science
PublisherSpringer
Volume4284
ISSN (Print)0302-9743

Conference

ConferenceInternational Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security (12th : 2006)
CityShanghai
Period3/12/067/12/06

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