Formal proofs for the security of signcryption

Joonsang Baek*, Ron Steinfeld, Yuliang Zheng

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

112 Citations (Scopus)


Signcryption is an asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a low computational and communication overhead. In this paper we propose realistic security models for signcryption which give the attacker power to choose both messages/signcryptexts as well as recipient/sender public keys when accessing the signcryption/unsigncryption oracles of attacked entities. We then show that Zheng's original signcryption scheme is secure in our confidentiality model relative to the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem and is secure in our unforgeability model relative to a Gap version of the discrete logarithm problem. All these results are shown in the random oracle model.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)203-235
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Cryptology
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2007


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