@inbook{1889ff7752664adaa5ee9aac0d70719a,
title = "Formal proofs for the security of signcryption",
abstract = "Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.",
author = "Joonsang Baek and Ron Steinfeld and Yuliang Zheng",
year = "2002",
doi = "10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6",
language = "English",
isbn = "3540431683",
volume = "2274",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)",
publisher = "Springer, Springer Nature",
pages = "80--98",
editor = "{Naccache }, D and P Paillier",
booktitle = "Public Key Cryptography",
address = "United States",
note = "5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 ; Conference date: 12-02-2002 Through 14-02-2002",
}