Formal proofs for the security of signcryption

Joonsang Baek, Ron Steinfeld, Yuliang Zheng

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

169 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Signcryption is a public key or asymmetric cryptographic method that provides simultaneously both message confidentiality and unforgeability at a lower computational and communication overhead. In this paper, we propose a sound security model for signcryption that admits rigorous formal proofs for the confidentiality and unforgeablity of signcryption. A conclusion that comes out naturally from this work is that, as an asymmetric encryption scheme, signcryption is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the random oracle model relative to, quite interestingly, the Gap Diffie-Hellman problem, and as a digital signature scheme, signcryption is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attack in the random oracle model relative to the discrete logarithm problem.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPublic Key Cryptography
Subtitle of host publication5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems - Proceedings
EditorsD Naccache , P Paillier
Place of PublicationBerlin; Heidelberg
PublisherSpringer, Springer Nature
Pages80-98
Number of pages19
Volume2274
ISBN (Electronic)9783540456643
ISBN (Print)3540431683, 9783540431688
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Event5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002 - Paris, France
Duration: 12 Feb 200214 Feb 2002

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume2274
ISSN (Print)03029743
ISSN (Electronic)16113349

Other

Other5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems, PKC 2002
CountryFrance
CityParis
Period12/02/0214/02/02

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  • Cite this

    Baek, J., Steinfeld, R., & Zheng, Y. (2002). Formal proofs for the security of signcryption. In D. Naccache , & P. Paillier (Eds.), Public Key Cryptography: 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems - Proceedings (Vol. 2274, pp. 80-98). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 2274). Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer, Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45664-3_6