Formal security analysis of Australian e-passport implementation

P. Vijayakrishnan*, Josef Pieprzyk, Huaxiong Wang

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference proceeding contributionpeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a detailed description of the current Australian e-passport implementation and makes a formal verification using model checking tools CASPER/CSP/FDR. We highlight security is-sues present in the current e-passport implementation and identify new threats when an e-passport system is integrated with an automated processing systems like SmartGate. Because the current e-passport specification does not provide adequate security goals, to perform a ra-tional security analysis we identify and describe a set of security goals for evaluation of e-passport pro-tocols. Our analysis confirms existing security is-sues that were previously informally identified and presents weaknesses that exists in the current e- passport implementation.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the Sixth Australasian Information Security Conference, AISC 2008
EditorsLjiljana Brankovic, Mirka Miller
Place of PublicationSydney
PublisherAustralian Computer Society
Pages75-82
Number of pages8
Volume81
ISBN (Print)9781920682620
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Event6th Australasian Information Security Conference, AISC 2008 - Wollongong, NSW, Australia
Duration: 22 Jan 200825 Jan 2008

Other

Other6th Australasian Information Security Conference, AISC 2008
CountryAustralia
CityWollongong, NSW
Period22/01/0825/01/08

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