Friendship might seem like a bizarre virtue—or not a virtue at all. Unlike courage and generosity, friendship seems to be a dyadic relation between two people. To be a friend is to be disposed to think, feel, desire, deliberate, act, and react in characteristic ways towards a particular person, who is likewise disposed to think, feel, desire, deliberate, act, and react in those same characteristic ways towards you. If no one else is a friend, then it is conceptually impossible for you to be a friend. This chapter describes some of the more interesting features of friendship, then explores the extent to which other virtues, such as trustworthiness, can be reconstructed as sharing those features.
|Title of host publication||From personality to virtue|
|Editors||Alberto Masala, Jonathan Webber|
|Place of Publication||Oxford, UK|
|Publisher||Oxford University Press|
|Number of pages||21|
|Publication status||Published - 2016|
- extended mind