From folk psychology to naive psychology

Andy Clark*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The notion of folk-psychology as a primitive speculative theory of the mental is called into question. There is cause to believe that folk-psychology has more in common with a naive physics than with early speculative physical theorising. The distinction between these is elaborated. The conclusion drawn is that commonsense ascription of psychological content, though not a suitable finishing point for cognitive science, should still provide a more reliable source of data than some contemporary theorists are willing to admit.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)139-154
Number of pages16
JournalCognitive Science
Volume11
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1987
Externally publishedYes

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