From folk psychology to naive psychology

Andy Clark

doi:10.1016/S0364-0213(87)80002-2

From folk psychology to naive psychology

Andy Clark^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The notion of folk-psychology as a primitive speculative theory of the mental is called into question. There is cause to believe that folk-psychology has more in common with a naive physics than with early speculative physical theorising. The distinction between these is elaborated. The conclusion drawn is that commonsense ascription of psychological content, though not a suitable finishing point for cognitive science, should still provide a more reliable source of data than some contemporary theorists are willing to admit.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	139-154
Number of pages	16
Journal	Cognitive Science
Volume	11
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/S0364-0213(87)80002-2
Publication status	Published - 1987
Externally published	Yes

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10.1016/S0364-0213(87)80002-2

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Clark, A. (1987). From folk psychology to naive psychology. Cognitive Science, 11(2), 139-154. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0364-0213(87)80002-2

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