TY - JOUR
T1 - Gender and bureaucratic corruption
T2 - evidence from two countries
AU - Decarolis, Francesco
AU - Fisman, Raymond
AU - Pinotti, Paolo
AU - Vannutelli, Silvia
AU - Wang, Yongxiang
PY - 2023/7/1
Y1 - 2023/7/1
N2 - We examine the correlation between gender and bureaucratic corruption using two distinct datasets, from Italy and from China. In each case, we find that women are far less likely to be investigated for corruption than men. In our Italian data, female procurement officials are 22% less likely than men to be investigated for corruption by enforcement authorities; in China, female prefectural leaders are 81% less likely to be arrested for corruption than men. While these represent correlations (rather than definitive causal effects), both are very robust relationships, which survive the inclusion of fine-grained individual and geographic controls, and based on Oster's (2019. “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence, ” 37 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 187-204.) test unlikely to be driven by unobservables. Using data from a survey of Italian procurement officials, we present tentative evidence on mechanism: the gender gap is partly due to women acting more “defensively” in administering their duties.
AB - We examine the correlation between gender and bureaucratic corruption using two distinct datasets, from Italy and from China. In each case, we find that women are far less likely to be investigated for corruption than men. In our Italian data, female procurement officials are 22% less likely than men to be investigated for corruption by enforcement authorities; in China, female prefectural leaders are 81% less likely to be arrested for corruption than men. While these represent correlations (rather than definitive causal effects), both are very robust relationships, which survive the inclusion of fine-grained individual and geographic controls, and based on Oster's (2019. “Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence, ” 37 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 187-204.) test unlikely to be driven by unobservables. Using data from a survey of Italian procurement officials, we present tentative evidence on mechanism: the gender gap is partly due to women acting more “defensively” in administering their duties.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85162907575&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/jleo/ewab041
DO - 10.1093/jleo/ewab041
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85162907575
SN - 8756-6222
VL - 39
SP - 557
EP - 585
JO - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
JF - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
IS - 2
ER -