Abstract
Gossip is often serious business, not idle chitchat. Gossip allows those oppressed to privately name their oppressors as a warning to others. Of course, gossip can be in error. The speaker may be lying or merely have lacked sufficient evidence. Bias can also make those who hear the gossip more or less likely to believe the gossip. By examining the social functions of gossip and considering the differences in power dynamics in which gossip can occur, we contend that gossip may be not only permissible but virtuous, both as the only reasonable recourse available and as a means of resistance against oppression.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 473-487 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Ethical Theory and Moral Practice |
Volume | 20 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jun 2017 |
Externally published | Yes |
Bibliographical note
Copyright the Author(s) 2017. Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.Keywords
- Burdened virtue
- Gossip
- Reputation
- Social epistemology
- Virtue