Greco on reliabilism and epistemic luck

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I outline Greco's response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. I also argue however that there is an account of epistemic luck available which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with and which could in principle at least be regarded as being in the spirit of the proposal that Greco sets out.

Original languageEnglish
Article number3232
Pages (from-to)35-45
Number of pages11
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume130
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2006
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Greco on reliabilism and epistemic luck'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this