Greco on reliabilism and epistemic luck

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1007/s11098-005-3232-2

Greco on reliabilism and epistemic luck

Duncan Pritchard^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

I outline Greco's response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. I also argue however that there is an account of epistemic luck available which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with and which could in principle at least be regarded as being in the spirit of the proposal that Greco sets out.

Original language	English
Article number	3232
Pages (from-to)	35-45
Number of pages	11
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	130
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-3232-2
Publication status	Published - Jul 2006
Externally published	Yes

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Greco on reliabilism and epistemic luck

Abstract

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