Group preference aggregation in the multiplicative AHP the model of the group decision process and pareto optimality

R. C. Van Den Honert*, F. A. Lootsma

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

72 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A recent paper has focused awareness on group aggregation procedures in the AHP, showing that geometric mean aggregation violates the desirable social choice axiom of Pareto optimality. We show that this violation can be attributed to the representation used to model the group decision process, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the Pareto optimality axiom. We furthermore propose a geometric mean group aggregation procedure which satisfies all the social choice axioms suggested.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)363-370
Number of pages8
JournalEuropean Journal of Operational Research
Volume96
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 24 Jan 1997
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Analytic hierarchy process
  • Decision analysis
  • Group aggregation
  • Pareto optimality

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