Heterogeneous computational resource allocation for C-RAN: a contract-theoretic approach

In this work, we develop a contract theory framework to tackle the allocations of heterogeneous baseband processing units (BBUs) in cloud radio access network. We first model a monopoly market by viewing the BBUs as a kind of resource. The infrastructure provider (InP), as the monopolist, owns all the heterogeneous BBUs of different processing abilities and maintaining costs, and leases them to multiple mobile network operators (MNOs) to gain profit. At the same time, the MNOs intend to rent reasonable amount of BBUs to provide services to their mobile clients. Then we propose a contract theory framework, in which contract items are optimized to maximize the InP's utility, while maintain the welfare of the MNOs. We design the optimal contracts with complete and asymmetric information on the MNOs. Our contract design achieves the near optimum solution to heterogeneous computational resource allocation even under the information asymmetric case. Our derivations indicate that the optimal contracts with asymmetric information achieve a lower utility for the InP than the ones with complete information and the utility reduction is higher when the BBUs are heterogeneous rather than homogeneous. Numerical results demonstrate that, the InP having heterogeneous BBUs can achieve a higher utility relative to having homogeneous BBUs, which is more profitable and realistic for the InP. Moreover, we regard Stackelberg game theoretic approach as a comparison, and show that our method is more realistic.