Holdup and innovation

Andrew Wait

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper examines the incentive to oppose innovation (or to delay agreement) when: there are multiple periods; previous outcomes affect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained. Current agreements affect the parties, claim on future surplus either by altering their default payoffs (historical bargaining/contractual positions) or by changing their relative contemporaneous bargaining strengths. Delay will occur at different times depending on which assumption applies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)277-295
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Volume85
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2005
Externally publishedYes

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Delay
  • Holdup
  • Incomplete contracts

Cite this