Holdup and innovation

Andrew Wait

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


This paper examines the incentive to oppose innovation (or to delay agreement) when: there are multiple periods; previous outcomes affect the subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained. Current agreements affect the parties, claim on future surplus either by altering their default payoffs (historical bargaining/contractual positions) or by changing their relative contemporaneous bargaining strengths. Delay will occur at different times depending on which assumption applies.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)277-295
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2005
Externally publishedYes


  • Delay
  • Holdup
  • Incomplete contracts


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