Imagining reasons

Jeanette Kennett*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this article, I explore the implications of Karsten Stueber's account of imaginative resistance, particularly as it relates to the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding described by Jonathan Haidt and colleagues. I suggest that Stueber's account allows us to redescribe the phenomenon as a failure of the folk psychological project of interpretation and so to challenge Haidt's metaethical conclusions. I close by considering some implications for moral deliberation and judgment in those, such as autistic people, whose interpretive capacities are impaired.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-192
Number of pages12
JournalSouthern Journal of Philosophy
Volume49
Issue numberSUPPL. 1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2011

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