In defence of modest anti-luck epistemology

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Abstract

ANTI-LUCK EPISTEMOLOGY Most epistemologists would accept that knowledge excludes luck in the specific sense that if one knows then it is not a matter of luck that one’s belief is true. Call this the anti-luck intuition. There is a certain kind of epistemological project – which I have christened anti-luck epistemology – which takes this intuition as central to our understanding of knowledge. Essentially, the idea is that once we identify which epistemic condition can satisfy the anti-luck intuition (call this the anti-luck condition), then we will have thereby identified a key component in a theory of knowledge. Central to this enterprise, as I explain below, is to gain a proper understanding of the nature of luck itself. We can distinguish between two forms of anti-luck epistemology. According to robust anti-luck epistemology, knowledge is nothing more than true belief that satisfies the anti-luck condition. According to modest anti-luck epistemology, in contrast, the anti-luck condition is merely a key necessary condition for knowledge, but it is not sufficient (with true belief) for knowledge. In what follows I will be offering a defence of modest anti-luck epistemology. SAFETY VERSUS SENSITIVITY There are two competing ways of understanding the anti-luck condition in the contemporary literature.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe sensitivity principle in epistemology
EditorsKelly Becker, Tim Black
Place of PublicationCambridge
PublisherCambridge University Press
Pages173-192
Number of pages20
ISBN (Electronic)9780511783630
ISBN (Print)9781107004238
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2012
Externally publishedYes

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