In defence of the doxastic conception of delusions

Tim Bayne*, Elisabeth Pacherie

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

96 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we defend the doxastic conception of delusions against the metacognitive account developed by Greg Currie and collaborators. According to the metacognitive model, delusions are imaginings that are misidentified by their subjects as beliefs: the Capgras patient, for instance, does not believe that his wife has been replaced by a robot, instead, he merely imagines that she has, and mistakes this imagining for a belief. We argue that the metacognitive account is untenable, and that the traditional conception of delusions as beliefs should be retained.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)163-188
Number of pages26
JournalMind and Language
Volume20
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2005

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