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Abstract
What explains the context sensitivity of some (apparent) beliefs? Why, for example, do religious beliefs appear to control behaviour in some contexts but not others? Cases like this are heterogeneous, and we may require a matching heterogeneity of explanations, ranging over their contents, the attitudes of agents and features of the environment. In this paper, I put forward a hypothesis of the last kind. I argue that some beliefs (religious and non-religious) are coupled to cues, which either trigger an internal representation or even partially constitute the beliefs. I show that such coupling will give rise to the context-sensitivity, without entailing that religious believers take a different attitude to belief content.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 344-365 |
Number of pages | 22 |
Journal | Contemporary Pragmatism |
Volume | 15 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Keywords
- Cognitive science of religion
- Delusion
- Mismatch
- Religious belief
- religious belief
- delusion
- BEHAVIOR
- REPRESENTATION
- cognitive science of religion
- BELIEF
- PERCEPTION
- RELIGION
- mismatch
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Dive into the research topics of 'In praise of outsourcing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.Projects
- 1 Finished
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Changing philosophical perceptions of belief in a post-truth world
Levy, N. & MQRES, M.
1/01/18 → 31/12/20
Project: Research