Innovation in a generalized timing game

Vladimir Smirnov*, Andrew Wait

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We characterize all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric model allowing both the leader's and the follower's payoff functions to be multi-peaked, non-monotonic and discontinuous. We provide sufficient conditions for when the equilibria can be Pareto-ranked and when the equilibrium is unique. Economic applications discussed include process and product innovation and the timing of the sale of an asset.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)23-33
Number of pages11
JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Volume42
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Entry
  • Follower
  • Leader
  • Process innovation
  • Product innovation
  • Timing games

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