Abstract
In this paper, I examine recent treatments of Peircean truth in terms of regulative principles or intellectual hopes, drawing on work by Christopher Hookway, Cheryl Misak, and Andrew Howat. In doing this I show that recent arguments by Huw Price that Peirce’s account cannot provide an eff ective truth norm do not apply when Peircean truth is construed as a regulative assumption on inquiry. I conclude by comparing the “anthropological” sensibilities of Price’s account of truth as convenient friction, and Peirce’s account of truth as a regulative assumption or intellectual hope.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 444-462 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society |
| Volume | 51 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1 Dec 2015 |