Intellectual hope as convenient friction

Albert Atkin*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, I examine recent treatments of Peircean truth in terms of regulative principles or intellectual hopes, drawing on work by Christopher Hookway, Cheryl Misak, and Andrew Howat. In doing this I show that recent arguments by Huw Price that Peirce’s account cannot provide an eff ective truth norm do not apply when Peircean truth is construed as a regulative assumption on inquiry. I conclude by comparing the “anthropological” sensibilities of Price’s account of truth as convenient friction, and Peirce’s account of truth as a regulative assumption or intellectual hope.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)444-462
Number of pages19
JournalTransactions of the Charles S Peirce Society
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1 Dec 2015


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