Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Duncan Pritchard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)


The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5515-5528
Number of pages14
Issue number6
Early online date8 Oct 2019
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2021
Externally publishedYes


  • Epistemic value
  • Epistemology
  • Inquiry
  • Intellectual virtue
  • truth


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