Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Duncan Pritchard

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z

Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Duncan Pritchard^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good is explained and defended. It is argued that this proposal has been prematurely rejected on grounds that are both independently problematic and which also turn on an implausible way of understanding the proposal. A more compelling account of what it means for truth to be the fundamental epistemic good is then developed, one that treats the intellectual virtues, and thereby virtuous inquiry, as the primary theoretical notion.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	5515-5528
Number of pages	14
Journal	Synthese
Volume	198
Issue number	6
Early online date	8 Oct 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z
Publication status	Published - Jun 2021
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Epistemic value
Epistemology
Inquiry
Intellectual virtue
truth

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10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z

Cite this

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Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth

Abstract

Keywords

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