Intelligence, warning, and policy: the Johnson administration and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia

Melanie Brand*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This article examines the impact of intelligence on policymaking in the Johnson Administration during the 1968 Prague Spring. It argues that the US intelligence community was unable to provide policymakers with an accurate picture of Soviet priorities during the Prague Spring and did not effectively communicate the increasing potential for Soviet military action. Although intelligence warnings were issued prior to the invasion, these warnings were neither forceful enough to counteract the belief that the Soviet leadership would refrain from invasion nor convincing enough to alter pre-existing policy positions. Consequently, intelligence had little impact on decision-making throughout the Prague Spring.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)197-214
Number of pages18
JournalCold War History
Volume21
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2021
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Cold War
  • Czechoslovakia
  • Intelligence
  • LBJ
  • Prague Spring
  • warning

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