Abstract
In Facts, reasons and joint action: thoughts on the social ontology of law, and Is Law Grounded in Joint Action?, Richard Ekins and Damiano Canale, respectively, raise several objections against the views that I defended in my article Austin, Hart and Shapiro: Three Variations of Law as an Entity Grounded in a Social Practice. Ekins and Canale make thought-provoking suggestions and express sharp criticisms concerning my reading of Austin, Hart and Shapiro, and my understanding of the relationship between collective intentionality, on the one hand, and the ontological structure of the law, on the other. The main purpose of this article is to respond to the most relevant objections they raise against my views.
| Translated title of the contribution | Collective intentionality and the ontological structure of law |
|---|---|
| Original language | Italian |
| Pages (from-to) | 133-148 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Diritto e questioni pubbliche |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |
Bibliographical note
Originally published in Rechtstheorie 45(3), 2014, pp. 335-353. doi: 10.3790/rth.45.3.335Keywords
- collective intentionality
- We-Intentions
- law as a social practice
- ontological structure of law