Is the body schema sufficient for the sense of embodiment? An alternative to de Vignemont's model

Glenn Carruthers*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

De Vignemont argues that the sense of ownership comes from the localization of bodily sensation on a map of the body that is part of the body schema. This model should be taken as a model of the sense of embodiment. I argue that the body schema lacks the theoretical resources needed to explain this phenomenology. Furthermore, there is some reason to think that a deficient sense of embodiment is not associated with a deficient body schema. The data de Vignemont uses to argue that the body image does not underlie the sense of embodiment does not rule out the possibility that part of the body image I call 'offline representations' underlies the sense of embodiment. An alternative model of the sense of embodiment in terms of offline representations of the body is presented.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)123-142
Number of pages20
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume22
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2009

Keywords

  • Body Representation
  • De Vignemont
  • Self Consciousness
  • Sense of Embodiment
  • Sense of Ownership

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