Is this a bullshit question? Just asking!

We develop an account of bullshit questions that draws on the literature on bullshit assertions. We distinguish bullshit questions from other sorts of anomalous questions. According to our account, bullshit questions are characterized chiefly by the indifference of the speaker to the truth of any answer she might receive. Instead, the bullshit questioner is up to something else, typically a non-interrogative illocutionary act such as introducing a presupposition, insinuating a derogatory sentiment, implying a proposition, making an accusation, or flirting. If this is right, it naturally raises the normative question of whether and how bullshit questions are wrong and whether and how bullshit questioners are blameworthy and vicious. In the final section, we address these questions, arguing that bullshit questions are pro tanto wrong because they tend to thwart inquiry, manifest the vice of epistemic insouciance (which is a disregard for truth or inquiry), express disrespect for the epistemic agency of the interlocutor, introduce epistemic malaise, and lead to the opening of dangerous inquiries by gullible audiences. We then consider some cases in which the pro tanto wrongness of bullshit questioning is arguably overridden by competing reasons.