Abstract
In common with most other authors, Mikhalevich & Powell assume that phenomenal consciousness is a "precondition" of moral standing. Although the evidence they present makes it much more likely than usually thought that arthropods are phenomenally conscious, scepticism in the face of this evidence remains intellectually respectable. I suggest that we best make progress here by rejecting the notion that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing. Mental states that may lack phenomenal properties can do a lot of work in grounding moral standing, and there is less room for scepticism about these mental states than about phenomenal consciousness.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 2 |
Pages (from-to) | 1-3 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Animal Sentience |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |