It might not matter very much whether insects are conscious

Neil Levy*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)
57 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In common with most other authors, Mikhalevich & Powell assume that phenomenal consciousness is a "precondition" of moral standing. Although the evidence they present makes it much more likely than usually thought that arthropods are phenomenally conscious, scepticism in the face of this evidence remains intellectually respectable. I suggest that we best make progress here by rejecting the notion that phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral standing. Mental states that may lack phenomenal properties can do a lot of work in grounding moral standing, and there is less room for scepticism about these mental states than about phenomenal consciousness.

Original languageEnglish
Article number2
Pages (from-to)1-3
Number of pages3
JournalAnimal Sentience
Volume29
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Bibliographical note

Version archived for private and non-commercial use with the permission of the author/s and according to publisher conditions. For further rights please contact the publisher.

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'It might not matter very much whether insects are conscious'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this