TY - GEN
T1 - Jamming of LoRa PHY and countermeasure
AU - Hou, Ningning
AU - Xia, Xianjin
AU - Zheng, Yuanqing
PY - 2021
Y1 - 2021
N2 - LoRaWAN forms a one-hop star topology where LoRa nodes send data via one-hop up-link transmission to a LoRa gateway. If the LoRa gateway can be jammed by attackers, the LoRa gateway may not be able to receive any data from any nodes in the network. Our empirical study shows that although LoRa physical layer (PHY) is robust and resilient by design, it is still vulnerable to synchronized jamming chirps. Potential protection solutions (e.g., collision recovery, parallel decoding) may fail to extract LoRa packets if an attacker transmits synchronized jamming chirps at high power. To protect the LoRa PHY from such attacks, we propose a new protection method that can separate LoRa chirps from jamming chirps by leveraging their difference in the received signal strength in power domain. We note that the new protection solution is orthogonal to existing solutions which leverage the chirp misalignment in time domain or the frequency disparity in frequency domain. We conduct experiments with COTS LoRa nodes and software defined radios. The results show that synchronized jamming chirps at high power can jam all previous solutions, while our protection solution can effectively protect LoRa gateways from the jamming attacks.
AB - LoRaWAN forms a one-hop star topology where LoRa nodes send data via one-hop up-link transmission to a LoRa gateway. If the LoRa gateway can be jammed by attackers, the LoRa gateway may not be able to receive any data from any nodes in the network. Our empirical study shows that although LoRa physical layer (PHY) is robust and resilient by design, it is still vulnerable to synchronized jamming chirps. Potential protection solutions (e.g., collision recovery, parallel decoding) may fail to extract LoRa packets if an attacker transmits synchronized jamming chirps at high power. To protect the LoRa PHY from such attacks, we propose a new protection method that can separate LoRa chirps from jamming chirps by leveraging their difference in the received signal strength in power domain. We note that the new protection solution is orthogonal to existing solutions which leverage the chirp misalignment in time domain or the frequency disparity in frequency domain. We conduct experiments with COTS LoRa nodes and software defined radios. The results show that synchronized jamming chirps at high power can jam all previous solutions, while our protection solution can effectively protect LoRa gateways from the jamming attacks.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85111922690&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/INFOCOM42981.2021.9488774
DO - 10.1109/INFOCOM42981.2021.9488774
M3 - Conference proceeding contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85111922690
SN - 9781665431316
BT - IEEE INFOCOM 2021 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
CY - Piscataway, NJ
T2 - 40th IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2021
Y2 - 10 May 2021 through 13 May 2021
ER -