Just say no? Addiction and the elements of self-control

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

In this chapter I argue that there is a normative aspect to self-control that is not captured by the purely procedural account to be drawn from dual process theories of cognition – which we only uncover when we consider what self-control is for and why it is valuable. For at least a significant sub-group of addicts their loss of control over their drug use may not be due to a lack or depletion of cognitive resources. Rather it may be that they have little confidence in their ability to exert control over their circumstances and shape the life they would value having and the person they would value being.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationAddiction and self-control
Subtitle of host publicationperspectives from philosophy, psychology and neuroscience
EditorsNeil Levy
Place of PublicationNew York, NY
PublisherOxford University Press
Pages144-164
Number of pages21
ISBN (Print)9780199862580
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameOxford series in neuroscience, law, and philosophy
PublisherOxford University Press

Keywords

  • Addiction
  • Self-control
  • Dual process theories
  • The good life
  • Diachronic welfare
  • The resigned addict

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  • Cite this

    Kennett, J. (2013). Just say no? Addiction and the elements of self-control. In N. Levy (Ed.), Addiction and self-control: perspectives from philosophy, psychology and neuroscience (pp. 144-164). (Oxford series in neuroscience, law, and philosophy). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199862580.003.0008