Knowing the answer, understanding and epistemic value

Duncan Pritchard

Knowing the answer, understanding and epistemic value

Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper principally argues for two controversial theses: that understanding, unlike knowledge, is distinctively valuable, and that understanding is the proper goal of inquiry.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	325-339
Number of pages	15
Journal	Grazer Philosophische Studien
Volume	77
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - Oct 2008
Externally published	Yes

Cite this

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