Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement

J. Adam Carter*, Duncan Pritchard

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

26 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a, 2011b; Brogaard, 2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2011, 2009, 2011). This proposal has proved controversial because knowledge-how and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)181-199
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume91
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jul 2015
Externally publishedYes

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