Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck

J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

27 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Reductive intellectualists (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011a; 2011b; Brogaard 2008b; 2009; 2011) hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)440-453
Number of pages14
JournalNous
Volume49
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Sep 2015
Externally publishedYes

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