Abstract
A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011; Stanley 2011a, 2011b] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 799-816 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
Volume | 93 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2 Oct 2015 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Cognitive achievement
- Epistemic luck
- Epistemic value
- Knowledge-how
- Virtue epistemology