Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

J. Adam Carter, Duncan Pritchard

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945, 1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g. Stanley and Williamson 2001; Brogaard 2008, 2009, 2011; Stanley 2011a, 2011b] maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)799-816
Number of pages18
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2 Oct 2015
Externally publishedYes


  • Cognitive achievement
  • Epistemic luck
  • Epistemic value
  • Knowledge-how
  • Virtue epistemology


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